Superior Recovery Services v. James E. Pett : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
Superior Recovery Services v. James E. Pett : Brief
of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jonathan P. Thomas; Jonathan P. Thomas, P.C.; Chris Daines; Christ Daines Law; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Charles A. Schultz; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Superior Recovery Services v. James E. Pett, No. 20070095 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/66
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SUPERIOR RECEIVABLE SERVICES, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
CaseNo.:20070095-CA 
JAMES E. PETT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
SUPERIOR RECEIVABLE SERVICES 
Appeal from a Judgment entered in the First Judicial District, Cache County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Judge Gordon J. Low, Presiding 
Charles A. Schultz 
222 West 700 South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Telephone: (435) 225-2636 
Attorney for Appellant 
Jonathan P. Thomas 
JONATHAN P. THOMAS, P.C. 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 792-4500 
Chris Daines 
CHRIS DAINES LAW 
135 North Main, Suite 108 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(435)752-1750 
Attorneys for Appellee 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JAN t S 2008 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
SUPERIOR RECEIVABLE SERVICES 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
Represented by: 
Jonathan P. Thomas 
JONATHAN P. THOMAS, P.C. 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 792-4500 
Chris Daines 
CHRIS DAINES LAW 
135 North Main, Suite 108 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(435)752-1750 
JAMES E. PETT 
Defendant/Appellant 
Represented by: 
Charles A. Schultz 
222 West 700 South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Telephone: (435) 225-2636 
SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICES, Inc. 
131 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
POINT 1 
I. THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES AS TO ANY 
MATERIAL FACTS 6 
A. The Fact that the Principal Balance was $572.00 is Undisputed 7 
B. The Fact that the $317.57 was a Collection Charge in addition 
to the Principal Balance is Undisputed 8 
C. The Fact that the Altius Payment Was Refunded is Undisputed 9 
II SUPERIOR IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 10 
A. Mr. Pett Owed Contractual Duties to InterWest 11 
B. Mr. Pett Owes Contract Interest, Collection Agency Fees, 
and Attorney's Fees 12 
C. The Trial Court Did Not Weigh Evidence 15 
D. The Trial Court Viewed All Evidence Favorably Toward Mr. Pett 16 
Point III 
MR. PETT'S MOTION TO STRIKE WAS 
APPROPRIATELY REJECTED 16 
Point IV 
SUPERIOR SHOULD BE AWARDED 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 17 
CONCLUSION 18 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 19 
-ii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Chrysler Dodge Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Cur ley, 
782 P.2d 536 (Utah App.1989) 13 
Clark v. American Standard, Inc., Utah, 583 P.2d618 (1978) 12 
Foster v. Montgomery, 12, 82 P.3d 191 (Utah App. 2003) 17 
Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980) ..17 
Mason v. Tooele City, 484 P.2d 153 (1971) 11 
Panos v. Olsen and Associates Const, Inc., 123 P.3d 816 (Utah App. 2005) 17 
RioAlgom Corp. v. JimcoLtd., 618 P.2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980) 12 
Webb v. Brinkerhoff Construction Co., 972 P.2d 74 (Utah 1988) 12, 14 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code 78-2a-3(2)G) 1 
Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 16 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 6, 10 
Rule 29 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 18 
Corbin on Contracts 11 
•iii-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SUPERIOR RECEIVABLE SERVICES, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
CaseNo.:20070095-CA 
JAMES E. PETT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
SUPERIOR RECEIVABLE SERVICES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a debt collection case. 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Superior Receivable Services ("Superior") moved for 
summary judgment, supported by the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins ("Gittins 
Affidavit") with exhibits. R. 29-35. On August 17, 2006, Defendant/Appellant, 
James E. Pett ("Mr. Pett") responded to the motion and affidavit with a 
1 
memorandum in opposition, R. 36-48, and an affidavit of Mr. Pett ("Pett 
Affidavit"). R. 49-51, 54-56. The court issued a memorandum decision, granting 
Superior's motion on September 1st. R. 73-74. 
On September 5th, Mr. Pett moved to strike the Gittins Affidavit. R. 75-83. 
Superior filed an opposition on September 13th. R. 84-86. Mr. Pett never 
submitted his motion to strike. 
On December 12th, counsel for Superior served on counsel for Mr. Pett a 
document titled "Findings, Order, and Judgment," prepared at the Court's 
direction in the earlier memorandum decision, granting Superior's motion for 
summary judgment. R. 94-96. The court signed the proposed order on December 
20th. Id. Also on December 20th Mr. Pett filed objections to the now-signed order. 
R. 97-100. 
On December 28th, the trial court issued a second memorandum decision, 
rejecting Mr. Pett's motion to strike the Gittins Affidavit, addressing Mr. Pett's 
"concerns", and effecting a minor amendment to the order. R. 101-105. The 
court later signed a follow-up order denying the motion to strike and overruling 
the other objections to the previous order. R. 110-12. 
Mr. Pett appealed the decision of the trial court granting summary 
judgment. R. 113-14. 
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STATEMENT OF FACIS 
On May 26, 2004, Mr. Pett signed a document titled "Consent and 
Conditions of Treatment" ("the Consent") in which he identifies himself as the 
father of a patient being admitted to Cache Valley Specialty Hospital for 
treatment. R. 30-32, 35. The Consent states in pertinent part the following: 
" FINANCIAL AGREEMENT: I agree to pay for all services and 
supplies rendered to the patient in accordance with the rates and 
financial policies in effect at the time of service. . . . I agree to pay 
interest fees on any unpaid balance after 60 days of or date of service 
at a rate not to exceed 18% apr. If this account is assigned to an 
attorney or a collection agency for collection then I agree to pay all 
collection agency fees, court costs, and attorney's fees. 
4 ASSIGNMENT OF PHYSICIAN BENEFITS: I am aware that 
physician services by Radiologist, Pathologist, Anesthesiologist, as 
well as medical, surgical and emergency care are not billed by the 
hospital but are billed separately. I understand that I am under the 
same obligation to those providers as stated in this agreement unless 
otherwise agreed to in writing with those providers. I authorize 
payment of any medical benefits for such claims to the appropriate 
provider. 
R, 35 (emphasis supplied). 
InterWest Anesthesia Associates ("InterWest") provided anesthesia to Mr. 
Pett's child on the day after the Consent was signed. R. 30-33, 35. InterWest 
charged $572.00 for these services. R. 30-33. On July 12, 2004, InterWest 
credited this account with a $334.62 payment made by Altius, an insurance 
company. R 34. Oi l Ji ily 28, 2005, lnk:i West iinnlc (lie fallowing notation on the 
account ledger: 
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ALTIUS PAID YOU $514.80 ON 2/25/05. PAYMENT IN FULL 
IS DUE IMMEDIATELY. ALTIUS IS RETRACTING THE 
PAYMENT MADE TO US. PLEASE CONTACT US IF YOU 
HAVE ANY QUESTIONS. THANK YOU! 
R. 33. On July 31, 2005, InterWest charged this account $334.62 with the 
notation: "7/31/2005 REFUND ALTIUS CK 5254." R. 33. No other payments 
were made on this account. R. 33-34. More than ten separate finance charges 
were posted to this account R. 33-34. Each time a finance charge was posted, a 
statement of the account was sent to Mr. Pett. R. 32, f^ 14. On September 1, 2005 
a "pre-collect letter" was sent to Mr. Pett. R. 33. On November 11, 2005 the 
account was sent to collections with the posting of a charge of $317.57 for that 
item. R. 34. 
Mr. Pett testified that he: "never signed any agreement with InterWest 
Anesthesia;" "never promised to pay InterWest any amount for anything;" "never 
even knew that InterWest provided services to any member of [his] family;" "never 
knew that InterWest existed until this lawsuit." R. 54. Furthermore, Mr. Pett states 
in his affidavit that "I have never signed any contracts or agreements with Superior 
for anything, nor would I ever do so." R. 56. Mr. Pett never denied, under oath or 
any allegations or pleadings, having signed the Consent. For example, in his 
answer, Mr. Pett "affirmatively asserts that 'exhibit A' attached to the plaintiffs 
complaint [the Consent] is not an agreement or contract with the plaintiffs 
assignor." R. 11. More directly, Mr. Pett admits in the Brief of Appellant (at 
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Pp.25-26) that "he signed the ' Consent and Conditions of Treatment' with Cache 
Valley Specialty Hospital." 
Mr Pett stated under oath that "I have never received any payment from 
Altii is in the fifteei 1 years I have been covered by their insurance" and ". . . I never 
received $514.80 from Altius on February 25, 2005." R. 55. IS lr. Pel t c lid nc it • 
provide any evidence that Altius did or did not pay $334.62 to InterWest or that 
InterWest did or did not return the $334.62 payment to Altius. For example, Mr. 
Pt-* :';<;ifV.* • -o way of knowing if Altius paid InterWest S ^  ^ . o - oi. July 
12, 2004,. . ."R. 55. 
Mr, Pett testified that "I have never received any bills from InterWest,..." 
and "I never received a "pre-collection letter,. . ." R. 55. Mr. Pett provided no 
e\ idence that statemei its en a pre -collection lettei < \ ere i lot sei it by InterWest. For 
example, Mr. Pett testified "I do not believe any [bills from InterWest] were ever 
sent" and "I do not believe any [pre-collection letters] were ever sent." R. 55. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Pett's claims of contests of fact fail because they are either immaterial 
or non-existent. 
Superior is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because InterWest is a 
third-party beneficiary of the contract between Mr. Pett and Cache •  ;iey Specialty 
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Hospital. There is no duty under this contract or the law for InterWest or Superior 
to notify Mr. Pett of an assignment. Mr. Pett is therefore liable for all promises 
made under the contract, including interest, costs, collection agency fees, and 
attorney's fees. The trial court did not weigh evidence and viewed all evidence in 
the light most favorable to Mr. Pett in arriving at its summary judgment 
conclusions. 
Mr. Pett's motion to strike the Gittins Affidavit was properly rejected as 
untimely, coming as it did after Mr. Pett responded to the Gittins Affidavit. 
Because Superior was properly awarded attorney's fees below, provision 
should be made for an award of Superior's attorney's fees on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
I. THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACTS 
There is no question under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that if 
any material fact is in genuine dispute, summary judgment is precluded. Under 
Utah case law (including citations provided by Mr. Pett), it is likewise clear that in 
assessing whether a factual dispute exists, the Court must accept all of the supplied 
evidence as true, and view all the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. Mr. Pett contends that there are three fact-dispute roadblocks that should 
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have detoured Superior from summary judgmei it ' I he trial court examined each of 
these focal points, and for good reasons, found Mr. Pett's positions to be without 
merit. 
A. The Fact that the Principal Balance was $572.00 is Undisputed 
Superior supplied evidence that the original (and only) charge for anesthesia 
services was $572.00. This evidence was contained in and attached to the 
Affida vit of V ' endy Gittins, the office rn.an.ager of Inter West, and custodian of its 
records, with access to all account information regarding Mr. Pett's accoi n it * vl licl i. 
was a business record. Gittins Affidavit |^ 2, R. 29. One of the business records, a 
"Patient Ledger Analysis," was attached and incorporated by reference into the 
affidavit, Gittins Affidavit^ 4 and. Exhibit R 30, 33 34 1 1 le ledger shows an 
entry for the original anesthesia services as a $572.00 charge. R. 33. Ms. Gittins 
also testifies directly that such was the original charge. Gittins Affidavit [^ 4, R. 30. 
Because the only payment made on the account was later reversed, it follows from 
the evidence tl lat the unpaid principal is still $57.2 00 ' Fhere is no evidence to the 
contrary. 
Mr. Pett points to two figures he says stand in contradiction to this amount. 
In I In; coiiipLiuil. the itemization of amounts owed listed $627.04 as "unpaid 
principal/ *• • - ••• •• :• ;otverifie< -.• . • \lence on which a 
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genuine conflict may be supported. Mr. Pett's perception of a conflict here seems 
slightly masochistic, since the principal owed under Ms. Gittins' sworn accounting 
is less than the same item as listed in the earlier pleading. (In preparing this brief, 
counsel noticed that the judgment incorrectly carried forward the extra $55.04 in 
principal. Superior stipulates to correction of the judgment so that the principal is 
reduced to $527.00 with corresponding reduction in interest and the total 
judgment. This clerical error was not one of Mr. Pett's objections to the trial 
court's summary judgment order.) 
B. The Fact that the $317.57 was a Collection Charge in addition to the Principal 
Balance is Undisputed 
The second claimed problem is expressed by Mr. Pett as an assertion that 
"only $317.57 was allegedly transferred to Superior for collection. (Record at 
34)." Brief of Appellant, p. 8. That record reference is to the second page of the 
patient ledger where, in bold the words "Charge Balance: $317.57" appear on the 
left just above the last two lines on that page. This entry is not contrary to the 
$572.00 principal. Ms. Gittins testified directly that "a collection charge was 
added to the account in the amount of $317.57 prior to referral to Superior. Please 
see Exhibit A" Gittins Affidavit *f 10, R.30. On the heading of the same page of 
the ledger the "Pat. Bal:" and "Total Bal:" are both listed as $952.71. R. 34. On 
the previous page a "Charge Balance" of $635.14 is listed. R. 33. Each of the two 
"Charge Balances" is associated with a separate "Charge Seq. #" and followed by a 
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series of "Tr - Seq. #s. R. 33-34. The $317.57 charge balance is followed by 
only one transaction, while the $635.14 charge balance is followed by nineteen 
transactions. The $317.57 collection charge is 50% of the $635.14 main charge 
balai ice, and tl lese t\ v o cl large balances add I lp to the ,"":* I otal Bali"1 of $952,71 
appearing at the heading of both pages of the ledger. R. 33-34. There is no 
mistake or legitimate confusion between the $317.57 collection charge, and the 
figure of $572.00 principal. 
C. The Fact that the Altius Payment Was Refunded is Undisputed 
Superior supplied evidence that Mr. Pett's insurer, Altius, made a payment 
to InterWest of $334.62 on July 12, 2004. Gittins Affidavit If 12, Exhibit A, R. 31, 
34. i \ i- :irect testimony, as well as a business record, evidencing 
InterWest's refund of the $334.62 to Altius with a consequent reversal of the 
previous credit. Gittins Affidavit f^ 13, Exhibit A, R. 31, 33. 
Three days prior to the refund, InterWest posted on Mr. Pett's account the 
reasoi <r>L \ - .: »\'/ * *r "retracting" the payrr A. 33. Mr Pett takes facti lal 
issue with that reasoning. Although Mr. Pett has thereby contested a fact, putting 
in question whether he received a $514.80 payment from Altius, that fact does not 
matter. 
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The rationale for the refund is irrelevant. The refund occurred, making the 
net effect the same as if the Altius payment had never been received in the first 
place. Mr. Pett says he was not receiving statements, so he was presumably 
unaware of either the payment or the refund. Indeed, he testified that he had "no 
way of knowing" whether Altius paid InterWest the $334.62 in the first place. 
(Mr. Pett could have sought a continuance to conduct discovery under Rule 56(f), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure if he doubted the payment had been refunded and 
wanted to obtain evidence to contest that fact.) The trial court recognized, 
appropriately, that the reasoning for the refund was not material to the existence or 
amount of the debt. R. 102-103. 
II. SUPERIOR IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Where the material facts are settled prior to trial, the law must still be 
applied to determine if the movant is entitled to summary judgment. Rule 56(c), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Pett argues four legal theories under which he 
attempts to pin the trial court with error in granting Superior's motion. 
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A. Mr. Pett Owed Contractual Duties to InterWest. 
Mr. Pett claims that because his agreement was not with InterWest, he 
doesn't owe InterWest. Mr. Pett misunderstands the relationship between Cache 
Valley Specialty Hospital ("the Hospital"), himself, and InterWest. 
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Mr. Pett, he did not enter into 
a contract with InterWest, made no promises to InterWest, and was oblivious to 
InterWest's existence until well after his child was admitted to the Hospital, and 
underwent anesthesia as part of her medical treatment. The only healthcare 
provider mentioned by name in the Consent is the Hospital. The Consent includes 
Mr. Pett's promise to the Hospital to pay for its services, plus interest at 18%, plus 
collection agency fees, court costs, and attorney's fees if the account is assigned for 
collection. Mr. Pett was thus in privity of contract with the Hospital. 
Mr. Pett was not in privity of contract with InterWest. But Mr. Pett 
expressly acknowledged in paragraph 1 of his contract with the Hospital, that his 
daughter could be provided treatment, including "anesthesia." In paragraph 4 of 
his contract with the Hospital, Mr. Pett stated he was "aware that physician 
services by . . . Anesthesiologist... are not billed by the hospital but are billed 
separately." Mr. Pett also promised that he was "under the same obligation to 
those providers as stated in this agreement..." These provisions and promises 
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placed InterWest Anesthesia, among others, in the status of third party beneficiary 
of the contract between the Hospital and Mr. Pett. 
Third-party beneficiaries are "persons who are recognized as having 
enforceable rights created in them by a contract to which they are not 
parties and for which they give no consideration," 4 Corbin on 
Contracts § 774 at 6 (1960). See Mason v. Tooele City, 26 Utah 2d 6, 
484 P.2d 153 (1971). For a third-party beneficiary to have a right to 
enforce a right, the intention of the contracting parties to confer a 
separate and distinct benefit upon the third party must be clear. Clark 
v. American Standard, Inc., Utah, 583 P.2d 618 (1978). 
Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980). 
Mr. Pett's discussion and citations regarding assignment thus have no 
bearing on InterWest's rights to enforce Mr. Pett's obligations under the Consent. 
Superior has not claimed that there was an assignment of the Consent from the 
Hospital to InterWest. InterWest did not need an assignment in order to gain rights 
under the Consent - InterWest was a beneficiary of the Consent from the moment 
Mr. Pett signed it, stating "I understand and accept the terms of this agreement..." 
B. Mr. Pett Owes Contract Interest, Collection Agency Fees, and Attorney's Fees 
Mr. Pett claims that by virtue of not having received notice of InterWest's or 
Superior's involvement before service of the summons, he is not responsible to pay 
the 18% interest, attorney's fees, or collection agency fees. His legal citation on 
this point is Webb v. Brinkerhoff Construction Co., 972 P.2d 74 (Utah 1988). The 
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Consent's clause regarding interest and these other fees dispenses with Mr. Pett's 
argument, and the Webb case is distinguishable on additional significant grounds. 
Central to Mr. Pett's argument is the notion that "neither InterWest nor 
Superior are entitled to simply file suit against Mr. Pett without first notifying Mr. 
Pett of the alleged obligation." Brief of Appellant, p.28. 
Under the Consent, interest begins accruing at 18% "after 60 days of 
discharge or date of service." There is no requirement that notice be given, let 
alone that notice be received. Certainly by signing, understanding, and agreeing to 
the terms of the Consent, Mr. Pett was notified that interest was running as of July 
23, 2004, 60 days after Mr. Pett's daughter received treatment. The agreement 
required nothing further. Mr. Pett was contractually responsible to pay "in 
accordance with the rates and financial policies in effect at the time of service." He 
has not pointed to or even alleged the existence of a financial policy in effect on 
May 24, 2004 requiring notice. 
With respect to liability for "collection agency fees" and "attorney's fees", 
paragraph 2 of the contract does impose one triggering condition: "If this account 
is assigned to an attorney or a collection agency for collection." As with interest, 
there is no requirement that Mr. Pett receive notice. There is no requirement that 
InterWest or anyone else send notice. (As the contract does not require notice, it is 
only in passing that Superior notes that InterWest provided, gave, sent to Mr. Pett 
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statements "on a regular basis", at least thirteen times, and a "pre-collection letter" 
on September 1, 2005, two months prior to sending the account to Superior. 
Gittins Affidavit ^ 14, R. 31, 33-34. Lack of receipt is not necessarily inconsistent 
with proper giving of notice. See Chrysler Dodge Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Curley, 
782 P.2d 536, 540-41 (Utah App.1989)). 
The Webb decision does not translate into a requirement on the part of 
Superior to notify Mr. Pett of an account assignment prior to suit. Webb stands for 
the proposition that an assignee, to protect itself, must notify the obligor before 
payment is made to the assignor. In other words, an obligor who is not notified of 
an assignment and who pays the original obligee, is not liable to an unknown 
assignee. 
If the debt is to be discharged by payment to someone other than the 
creditor because of. . . assignment, unambiguous notification of the 
change must be given the debtor; otherwise, the debtor is entitled to 
discharge the debt by paying the original creditor. A debtor, having 
no notice of an assignment of the debt, cannot be held liable to pay 
the same debt twice. 
Webb, 972 P.2d at 77. Under Webb, if Mr. Pett had made a payment to the 
Hospital for the anesthesia bill, he might nonetheless have a payment defense 
(though it would be a stretch given the language of the Consent) if notice of 
Inter West's involvement had not been sent. Mr. Pett has not asserted that such a 
payment was made. Under Webb, if Mr. Pett had made a payment to InterWest on 
this account before notice was given of the referral to Superior for collection, he 
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could defend Superior's suit to the extent the payment extinguished the debt. 
Again, Mr. Pett does not claim to have made a payment to InterWest (or to 
Superior or to anyone else on this account). The Webb decision does not help Mr. 
Pett. 
C. The Trial Court Did Not Weigh Evidence. 
Mr. Pett claims that the trial court engaged in an impermissible exercise of 
weighing evidence to arrive at a summary judgment. Judge Low's second 
memorandum decision is quoted at length at pages 16-17 of the Brief of Appellant. 
Neither these quotes nor any other inkling in the record shows that the court 
weighed evidence - the court did not need to weigh evidence, because, as shown 
above, there was no evidence to put on the scales opposite the essential material 
facts demonstrating Superior's entitlement to a summary judgment. 
The court sorted through the facts to determine which ones were material. 
The court mentioned some of the facts it was disregarding as irrelevant. However, 
this is not an exercise in balancing testimony or assessing credibility, but rather the 
sharing of extensive reasoning for the court's legal determinations. 
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D. The Trial Court Viewed All Evidence Favorably Toward Mr. Pett 
Mr. Pett's claims that the trial court failed to view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Mr. Pett. This assertion, re-quoting passages from the second 
memorandum decision, is otherwise bare. 
Due to the standard of review, this Court must also indulge Mr. Pett in any 
reasonable inferences that favor him. As shown above, favorable illuminations and 
liberal indulgences do not reveal or produce facts disruptive of the summary 
judgment. 
Point III 
MR. PETT'S MOTION TO STRIKE WAS APPROPRIATELY REJECTED. 
The trial court rejected Mr. Pett's motion to strike the Gittins Affidavit as 
"late and inappropriate. Leave could have been requested by Defendant if he 
sought to set aside the Court's memorandum decision or to otherwise attack the 
judgment." R. 101. Under Rule 12(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to 
strike is made "before responding to a pleading." Mr. Pett's motion to strike came 
two weeks after his response to the affidavit and was therefore untimely under the 
rules, if not on general principles of judicial economy. 
Mr. Pett's motion to strike lacks merit. The Gittins Affidavit was based on 
personal knowledge, no matter how much Mr. Pett wishes to argue. It showed the 
basis of the affiant's personal knowledge, and demonstrated the reliability of the 
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business records which were attached and on which the testimony focused. 
Accordingly any possible error in the trial court's procedural ruling would have 
been harmless. 
Point IV 
SUPERIOR SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Superior was granted an award of $1,230.00 in attorney's fees by the trial 
court. R. 95. As demonstrated above, the award was entirely appropriate, based on 
a contractual provision. As such, Superior should also be awarded its attorney's 
fees incurred on appeal, if it prevails. 
"In Utah, attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by statute or 
contract. If provided for by contract, attorney fees are awarded in 
accordance with the terms of that contract." Foster v. Montgomery, 
2003 UT App 405,1m 12, 82 P.3d 191 (citations and quotations 
omitted); see also Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 
617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980) (holding that a contract provision for 
attorney fees includes those incurred by the prevailing party on 
appeal as well as at trial). . . . Olsen is the prevailing party on appeal 
and, therefore, is awarded attorney fees on appeal. We remand to the 
trial court for a determination of attorney fees reasonably incurred on 
appeal. 
Panos v. Olsen and Associates Const, Inc., 123 P.3d 816, 822 (Utah App. 2005). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court's summary judgment in all respects, 
as well as its decision to reject the untimely motion to strike. The Court should 
also award Superior its reasonable attorney's fees incurred on appeal, the amount 
to be fixed by the trial court on remand. 
Superior will also note that it appears that the facts and arguments have 
adequately presented through the briefs and the record, such that, pursuant to Rule 
29(a)(3) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the decisional process will not be 
significantly aided by oral argument 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of January, 2008. 
JONATHAN P. THOMAS^.C. 
Jopdmetn P. Thomas ^ - ^ 
^tforney for Plaintiff/Appellee/Superior 
CHRIS DAINES LAW 
Chris Daines 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee/Superior 
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